{"id":24,"date":"2025-06-19T14:55:45","date_gmt":"2025-06-19T14:55:45","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/localhost\/barnettcal\/?post_type=content&p=24"},"modified":"2025-12-09T09:26:14","modified_gmt":"2025-12-09T09:26:14","slug":"updates","status":"publish","type":"content","link":"https:\/\/staging.routledgelearning.com\/barnettcal\/updates\/","title":{"rendered":"Updates"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Autumn 2025<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Chapter 3: The Rule of Law <\/summary>\n

An Inquiry into the rule of law is being undertaken by the Constitution Committee of the House of Lords. The Committee is examining the state of the rule of law in the United Kingdom and how it works across Parliament, the judiciary and the executive.  <\/p>\n<\/details>\n\n\n\n

Chapter 5: The Royal Prerogative <\/summary>\n

State immunity<\/strong> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The State Immunity Act 1978 protects foreign states from civil actions. Under section 5 a state is not immune from liability for actions which cause \u2018personal injury\u2019. The meaning of personal injury was held to include psychiatric injury in Shehabi v Kingdom of Bahrain <\/em><\/strong>[2024] EWCA Civ 1158. The Court of Appeal also held that an act or omission causing injury did not have to be carried out in the United Kingdom. Accordingly, the state of Bahrain was liable for installing spyware on the computers of individuals in the UK: it was not entitled to state immunity.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

NB Correction:<\/strong> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

On Page 125, under Reform of the Prerogative <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Note that as discussed on page 109, the Fixed-Term Parliaments Act 2011 has been repealed, and the prerogative of dissolution restored under the Dissolution and Calling of Parliament Act 2022. <\/p>\n<\/details>\n\n\n\n

Chapter 11: Devolution <\/summary>\n

From 2026, the Welsh Senedd will employ the Closed List Proportional Representation electoral system. The number of MSs will increase from 60 to 96, and the number of constituencies decrease from 40 to 16, with each constituency electing six Members of the Senedd. See the Senedd Cymru (Members and Elections) Act 2024. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Political parties may propose up to eight candidates for each constituency. Independent candidates can also stand. Seats are allocated according to the share of the vote achieved, with the top candidates on the party list (or independents) being awarded seats.   <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill 2025 <\/strong>introduces wide-ranging reforms to devolution and local government. When enacted, the Act will establish a \u2018standardised, framework of devolved powers, duties and functions\u2019 and reform local government. The Act will introduce Strategic Authorities (SAs) covering all areas of England. There will be three different levels: <\/p>\n\n\n\n

    \n
  • Foundation Strategic authorities; <\/li>\n\n\n\n
  • Mayoral Strategic Authorities; and <\/li>\n\n\n\n
  • Established Mayoral Strategic Authorities.  <\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n

    Ministerial powers will enable the Government to establish or expand SAs and to direct an SA to have a mayor. Powers will be standardised and mayors will have revenue-raising powers.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Local authorities will be reorganised to allow for a single tier of local government and require all local authorities to move to a leader and cabinet style of local government, unless they already have a local authority mayor. <\/p>\n<\/details>\n\n\n\n

    Chapter 14: Introduction to the House of Commons<\/summary>\n

    The Procedure Committee of the House of Commons is undertaking an inquiry into the use of electronic voting in the House of Commons. <\/p>\n<\/details>\n\n\n\n

    Chapter 15: Scrutiny of the Executive <\/summary>\n

    The Supreme Court considered the correct approach to cases where multiple qualified exemptions to disclosure exist under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOI) in Department for Business and Trade v Information Commissioner <\/em><\/strong>[2025] UKSC 27; Times LR 19 August.<\/em> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Under section 2 of the FOI, where there are more than one exemption, these are to be considered cumulatively rather than separately. The correct focus of the exercise was to assess whether the public interest in upholding the exemption outweighed the public interest in disclosing it.  <\/p>\n<\/details>\n\n\n\n

    Chapter 17: Parliamentary Privilege<\/summary>\n

    In Green v United Kingdom <\/em><\/strong>(2025) Times LR 14 July the European Court of Human Rights considered the breadth of parliamentary privilege. A member of the House of Lords had revealed the identity of an individual who was subject to an interim injunction imposed by a court pending trial. The Court of Human Rights ruled that there was no violation of Article 8 (the right to private and family life etc). The House of Lords, under the doctrine of privilege, enjoyed a wide margin of appreciation in regulating its own affairs, including rules preventing members from revealing information which could interfere with an individual\u2019s Article 8 rights. The Court also rejected a claim relating to Article 6 (right to fair trial etc).  The Court accepted that Article 6 rights were affected by privilege but that the matter fell within the state\u2019s margin of appreciation with which the Court would not interfere.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

    However, the Court also considered the wider constitutional issues raised by privilege and called for the rules to be kept under \u2018regular review\u2019. In addition to the impact on individual privacy, there were also implications for the rule of law and separation of powers in a situation where, through privilege, parliament \u2018usurped\u2019 the role of judges who, after considering the evidence, had imposed an injunction to protect an individual\u2019s privacy.<\/p>\n<\/details>\n\n\n\n

    Chapter 18: The Protection of Human Rights<\/summary>\n

    In R (Tortoise Media Ltd) v Conservative and Unionist Party <\/em><\/strong>[2025] EWCA Civ 673, the Conservative Party was held not to be a public authority under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 when electing a new party leader. Accordingly, the decision was not amenable to judicial review. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

    The election of the party leader at a time when the party was in government with a majority in Parliament involved three processes. The first was the selection of the party leader, the second the incumbent Prime Minister\u2019s advice to the monarch on who to invite to be the next Prime Minister and the third the appointment of that person to be Prime Minister. Under challenge was the first of these stages The Court of Appeal held that in exercising this function the Party was exercising a private, not public function: therefore the Party was not a public authority within the meaning of section 6.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

    The Court of Human Rights ruled, in Hayes v United Kingdom <\/em><\/strong>(Application No 56532\/22; Times LR 8 September 2025), that extradition to face life imprisonment without parole in the USA, on the facts of the case, was not disproportionate and would not violate Article 3 ECHR.   <\/p>\n\n\n\n

    In In re the matter of an application by JR87 for Judicial Review <\/em><\/strong>[2025] UKSC 40, the Supreme Court considered ECHR A2P1 in conjunction with Article 9. A1P1 provides the right to education and that the state shall respect the right of parents to ensure that education conforms \u2018with their own religious and philosophical convictions\u2019.   <\/p>\n\n\n\n

    The child, \u2018JR87\u2019 attended a primary school in Belfast. Her parents objected to the religious education which followed the Department of Education\u2019s core syllabus and sought judicial review. The parents succeeded before the High Court, which held that the religious education which focused on Christianity was not provided in an \u2018objective, critical, and pluralistic manner\u2019. The parents had a statutory right to withdraw their child from religious education. However, this placed an undue burden on the parents and risked stigmatising the child. Accordingly, there as a breach of A1P1 when read with Article 9. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

    The Court of Appeal agreed with the High Court over the content of the religious education but disagreed that the right to withdraw the child was not a sufficient remedy to avoid a breach of A1P1. The right to withdraw ensured that the state did not pursue the forbidden aim of \u2018indoctrination\u2019 and the Court doubted whether there was either an undue burden on the parents or stigmatisation of the child. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

    The Supreme Court held, in part, that a right to withdraw was capable of placing an undue burden on the parents. Furthermore, the Supreme Court did not accept the Court of Appeal\u2019s distinction between indoctrination and the provision of education that was not objective, critical and pluralistic. These concepts were \u2018two sides of the same coin\u2019 and the Court of Appeal should have held that there was a breach of A1P1. The Court reinstated the declaration made by the High Court.<\/p>\n<\/details>\n\n\n\n

    Chapter 20: Freedom of Association and Assembly, Police Powers and Public Order <\/summary>\n

    R v Sarti (Chiara) <\/em><\/strong>[2025] EWCA Crim 61; [2025] 1 WLR 3276. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Under section 7 of the Public Order Act 2023, it is an offence \u2018to do an act which interferes with the use or operation of any key national infrastructure in England and Wales\u2019 with intent to do so or \u2018reckless as to whether it will do so\u2019. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Just Stop Oil protesters engaged in a slow walk blocking a carriageway and were convicted under section 7. In the course of their protest they had been repeatedly requested by the police to move off the highway, but refused and then blocked the road by sitting or lying on the ground. They were arrested and charged.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

    The defendants argued that their conviction violated their right to freedom of expression and freedom of assembly and association under Articles 10 and 11 ECHR.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

    The Court of Appeal ruled that their conviction was a proportionate interference with Articles 10 and 11. Parliament had clearly intended the offence to cover protests and had been mindful of the protesters\u2019 ECHR rights, as demonstrated by limiting the offence to interference with main roads and the requirement that the prosecution prove that \u2018significant delay\u2019 had been caused.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

    See also In re Abortion Services (Safe Access Zones) (Northern Ireland) Bill <\/em><\/strong>[2022] UKSC 32; [2023] AC 505 on proportionality issues being decided by juries and DPPv Ziegler <\/em><\/strong>[2021] UKHL 23; [2022] AC 408 on obstructing the highway (Textbook page 489). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

    The lawfulness of Regulations issued by the Secretary of State under the Public Order Act 1986 (POA) was challenged in R (National Council for Civil Liberties) v Secretary of State for the Home Department <\/em><\/strong>(2024)1<\/sup>There were four grounds of challenge: <\/p>\n\n\n\n

      \n
    1. The Regulations were ultra vires<\/em>, on the basis (a) that the powers were introduced to clarify the meaning of \u2018serious disruption\u2019 and (b) that the definitions of \u2018disruption\u2019 and \u2018[life of the] \u2018community\u2019 went beyond the scope of the enabling power. <\/li>\n\n\n\n
    2. The Regulations were ultra vires<\/em> because they sought t achieve by delegated legislation something which Parliament had rejected as primary legislation; <\/li>\n\n\n\n
    3. The Regulations were unlawful in that they circumvented the will of Parliament and lacked objective justification; and <\/li>\n\n\n\n
    4. The Regulations were unlawful in that they were the result of an unfair consultation process. <\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n

      Sections 12 and 14 of the POA 1986 were amended by the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 (PCSCA) which conferred power on the Secretary of State to amend terms in the POA by secondary legislation (a Henry VIII power).  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

      Were the Regulations within the scope of the enabling powers? The dispute focused on whether the expression \u2018more than minor\u2019 fell within the linguistic scope of \u2018serious\u2019. The SS argued for a broad approach to interpretation of the word \u2018serious\u2019, while Liberty (the NCCL) argued (on several grounds: see para 89) that a narrow construction was required and that a broad interpretation would \u2018substantially lower\u2019 the protection given to fundamental common law rights of public processions and assembly and increase the risk to protesters of criminal sanctions. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

      Grounds 1 and 4 succeeded before the Court with the conclusion that the Regulations were unlawful. On Ground 1, the Court adopted the \u2018conventional approach to interpretation, applying the \u2018ordinary and natural\u2019 meaning of the words. This led to the conclusion that \u2018more than minor\u2019 was not within the scope of the word \u2018serious\u2019 (see para 100). On Ground 4, the challenge succeeded because the consultation process adopted by the Government was on eight different grounds held to be unfair and unlawful.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

      Statutory interpretation was central to Carter v Chief Constable of Essex Police <\/em><\/strong>[2025] EWCA Civ 367 which concerned section 54(4)(a) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE), and the question whether section 54 required the belief of the police officer to be \u2018reasonable\u2019.  The Court held that as a matter of \u2018pure statutory interpretation\u2019 it was necessary to identify the meaning of words in a particular context. Whereas in other provisions Parliament had inserted the requirement of reasonableness, in section 54 there was no such requirement. All that was needed was that an officer had a belief not that it had to be reasonable.  The Court concluded that this was a deliberate decision by Parliament and reasonableness could not be implied by the Court. In this case, there was no need (as argued by the Chief Constable) for the Court to examine the any external materials to aid with interpretation. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

      On statutory interpretation see also Darwell v Dartmoor National Park Authority <\/em><\/strong>[2025] UKSC 20. <\/p>\n<\/details>\n\n\n\n

      Chapter 21: State Security<\/summary>\n

      N3 and E3 v Secretary of State for the Home Department; ZA v Same, <\/em><\/strong>[2025] UKSC 6. N3<\/em><\/strong> <\/strong>concerned the lawfulness of an order depriving her of her British citizenship on grounds of national security (under section 40 of the British Nationality Act 1981) and the effect of that deprivation order having been withdrawn following a decision of SIAC.. ZA was born in 2019. Had her mother, E3, had been a British citizen, ZA would have been entitled to British citizenship by birth.  In part, the appeal concerned the effect of the deprivation order being withdrawn.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

      The Supreme Court ruled, in part, that the effect of withdrawing the deprivation order was that it was to be treated as having no effect in the period from making the order until it was withdrawn. Accordingly, N3 and E3 were to be regarded as having British citizenship throughout that time, and ZA was also a British citizen.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

      Deprivation of citizenship on grounds of national security was also considered in U3 v Secretary of State for the Home Department <\/em><\/strong>[2025] UKSC 19. The Supreme Court stated that the primary decision-maker in assessments of risks to national security was the Home Secretary, not SIAC (Special Immigration Appeals Commission). The Home Secretary had issued the deprivation order and rejected an application by U3 for leave to enter the UK. U3 appealed to SIAC. The Supreme Court explained that SIAC could consider questions of fact as well as points of law and could also consider evidence which had come to light after the deprivation decision was taken. The evaluation of the risk to national security was the responsibility of the Secretary of State, subject to a right of appeal to SIAC. SIAC could not overturn the Home Secretary\u2019s assessment. The appellant also argued that her rights under Article 8 ECHR (private and family life etc) had been breached. However, SIAC had considered this claim and rightly concluded that the interference with her Article 8 rights was proportionate. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

      In June 2025 the Secretary of State for the Home Department announced the proscription of Palestine Action under the Terrorism Act 2000. The proscription was challenged by one of the founders of Palestine Action in an application for judicial review, an application opposed by the Home Secretary (HS). See R (Huda Ammori) v Secretary of State for the Home Department <\/em><\/strong>[2025] EWHC 2013 (Admin) <\/p>\n\n\n\n

      There were eight grounds of challenge. One of the grounds for the HS opposing the application was that there was an alternative available avenue of challenge, and that judicial review was only appropriate where there was no other suitable procedure available. The claimant could have applied to the HS for PA to be deproscribed, and if that was refused, could have appealed to the Proscribed Organisations Appeals Commission (POAC) To allow an application for judicial review, it was argued (among other things), would undermine the specialist statutory scheme established for this purpose by Parliament. Further, unlike judicial review, an appeal to the POAC was as of right. On the other hand, an appeal against proscription could entail an extended period of time during which proscription remained in effect, with the consequence that support for the PA was a criminal offence.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

      A related issue for consideration was the effect of proscription on freedom of expression and assembly while the proscription order remained in force. This, Mr Justice Chamberlain stated, would have \u2018a significant chilling effect on the legitimate political speech of many thousands of people, that would do considerable harm to the public interest\u2019. This factor supported the case for judicial review which could be undertaken in the autumn of 2025 (rather than a hearing by the POAC which would take place in summer 2026).  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

      The Court held that an application to deproscribe, and an appeal to POAC if that application was refused, was not an appropriate alternative remedy to judicial review. It was also notable that Parliament had not ousted the judicial review jurisdiction. Of the eight grounds of challenge, ground 2 on the alleged interference with Article 10 and 11 rights, and ground 8 – the duty to consult PA before making the Order \u2013 succeeded and permission to apply for judicial review was granted on those grounds, but refused on all other grounds2<\/sup>.   <\/p>\n\n\n\n

      Judicial review hearings into the lawfulness of proscribing Palestine Action took place in the High Court in November 2025.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

      Tackling new forms of extremism was the subject of a House of Commons inquiry by the Home Affairs Select Committee. The ongoing inquiry opened in May 2025.<\/p>\n<\/details>\n\n\n\n

      Chapter 22: Part B: The English Legal System <\/summary>\n

      In 2025 the criminal justice system was reported by the Ministry of Justice to have a backlog of 78,000 cases, with some criminal trials being listed for 2029. The Justice Secretary has proposed that trial by jury should be restricted to the most serious cases, including murder, manslaughter and rape. Oher criminal cases should be heard by a judge sitting alone. This reform will require primary legislation, expected to be introduced in 2026.  The proposal goes further than that of Sir Brian Leveson, a retired Court of Appeal judge who, following his review, recommended the introduction of an intermediate level of court (between the Magistrates Courts and Crown Court) with a judge sitting with two magistrates to hear a range of cases currently tried by jury. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

      Access to justice, legal advice and representation and legal aid restrictions were the subject of an inquiry by the House of Commons Justice Committee. <\/p>\n<\/details>\n\n\n\n

      Chapter 26: Grounds for Judicial Review II \u2013 Procedural Impropriety<\/summary>\n

      The Doctrine of Proportionality  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

      Shvidler v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth and Development Affairs; Dalston Projects Ltd v Secretary of State for Transport <\/em><\/strong>[2025] UKSC 30. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

      The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 gave rise to sanctions being imposed by the UK government on Russian nationals, including the two appellants. In challenging the decision to impose sanctions on them, they argued that sanctions disproportionately interfered with their rights under the ECHR Mr Shvidler had been designated, with the effect that his worldwide assets were frozen and that it became a criminal offence for others to deal with him in either a private or commercial capacity (subject to limited exceptions). Mr Shvidler is a British citizen who had no links with the Russian regime but was associated with Roman Abramovich (who had such links) and had been a non-executive director of a company which operated through subsidiaries in Russia. Dalston Projects own a yacht, The Phi<\/em>, which was detained by the Secretary for Transport thereby depriving the owners of income. The Court of Appeal had dismissed their appeals as did the Supreme Court, by a majority.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

      Shvidler<\/em><\/strong> provided the opportunity for the Supreme Court to review the proper approach to the application of proportionality by the courts, and also the margin of appreciation to be accorded to the executive over the issue of sanctions.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

      The Court considered two possible approaches to allegations of Convention breaches and proportionality.  On Convention rights, the first possible approach was that an appellate court should confine itself to its reviewing function, considering the grounds for judicial review. The second approach was that the appellate court should decide for itself whether there had been a violation of Convention rights,  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

      On proportionality there were also two possible approaches. The first being that the court limits itself to reviewing whether the first instance court has applied the correct test for proportionality and only interfering where the lower court has made a significant error. The second approach was for the reviewing court to make its own assessment of proportionality. This will be appropriate where there is a general principle arising or the issue is one of \u2018major social or political significance\u2019. In such cases it is expected that the reviewing court will make its own independent assessment. Where it is unclear which approach should be taken, it may be necessary for the appellate court to consider both approaches. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

      The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals. Lord Leggat (judgment paragraphs 245 \u2013 324) agreed with the majority that an appeal court must make its own assessment of legality. However, he disagreed on the legality of the sanctions imposed on Mr Shvidler and on the breadth of the margin of appreciation to be accorded to the government. On sanctions, Lord Leggat found them to be \u2018unjust and disproportionate\u2019 and that the \u2018removal of basic freedoms\u2019 to which Mr Shvidler was entitled as a British citizen was unlawful. <\/p>\n<\/details>\n\n\n\n

      Chapter 26: Part B \u2013 Inquiries <\/summary>\n

      In In re JR222<\/em><\/strong> [2024] UKSC 35; Times LR <\/em>9 December 2024, the Supreme Court ruled that a public inquiry could not be suspended to allow for relevant criminal proceedings to be completed unless the Minister concerned certified that it was \u2018necessary\u2019 for him or her to do so.  The Court was concerned with the interpretation of section 13(1) Inquiries Act 2005. In doing so the Court considered a legislative debate (in the House of Lords) in which Lord Evans had made a \u2018clear and unequivocal statement\u2019 on the point of interpretation the Court was considering (see Pepper v Hart<\/em><\/strong> (1993). <\/p>\n<\/details>\n","protected":false},"featured_media":0,"parent":0,"template":"single-chapter","meta":{"_acf_changed":false},"class_list":["post-24","content","type-content","status-publish","hentry"],"acf":[],"aioseo_notices":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/staging.routledgelearning.com\/barnettcal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/content\/24","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/staging.routledgelearning.com\/barnettcal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/content"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/staging.routledgelearning.com\/barnettcal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/content"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/staging.routledgelearning.com\/barnettcal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=24"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}