Chapter 3
Plato vs. the Sophists: Rhetoric on Trial
Chapter Overview
Plato recognized the power of persuasive language, particularly when employed by a trained practitioner of rhetoric. He also saw a great danger in this power. Rhetoric in the service of personal motives, and appealing to an ignorant public, would lead a society to ruin. In Gorgias, he reveals the problems inherent in the practice of rhetoric when it is not joined to wisdom and a true knowledge of justice. Plato asked his readers to consider what constitutes “the good life.” Rhetoric can serve good or evil goals. Plato suggests in Phaedrus, there can be a true art of rhetoric. It would consist of a thorough knowledge of the different types of human souls, as well as a thorough knowledge of how to make arguments that would appeal to each type of soul.
Review Questions
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Plato’s first concern with rhetoric is that it does not embody an adequate conception of justice and is therefore dangerous. Secondly, he says that many people are attracted to rhetoric for its power to manipulate and coerce. He believes that these two points will mislead people and result to the corruption of the polis.
The systematic presentation of rhetoric’s principles, descriptions of its various functions, and explanations of how rhetoric achieves its goals.
Plato labels rhetoric a counterfeit of justice. He sees justice as a means of restoring, or healing, unjust or immoral souls. Rhetoric pretends to reveal justice in courtrooms, but because the Sophists only create beliefs about justice, and can mislead judges and juries with these beliefs, rhetoric is a sham art. Rhetoric is not used to heal souls, but instead merely to win courtroom cases.
There are three parts to the soul and the part of the soul allowed to govern or control the other two determines what type of soul an individual possesses. Plato identifies the three types of souls as:
- The wisdom loving soul—the philosopher’s soul is governed by the wisdom loving part.
- The nobility loving soul—military leaders are governed by this part of the soul.
- The appetite loving soul—people who spend their lives seeking pleasure are governed by this part of the soul.
The jian shi were advisers in ancient China that would travel from state to state advising rulers. Translated as “traveling persuaders,” the jian shi were rhetoricians who would try to persuade rulers to enact their plans and ideas. As Chinese leaders gave great significance to the wisdom of past kings, the jian shi would often use stories of previous rulers in order to convey their arguments. The Chinese field of rhetoric was largely developed for the type of political advising that the jian shi provided, making them important figures in the Chinese rhetorical tradition.
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Essay Questions
- What is Plato’s general argument against the Sophists in his dialogue Gorgias? About which aspect of sophistic rhetoric is he apparently most concerned? What, specifically, does Plato mean by his peculiar comparison of rhetoric to cooking? Would Plato’s argument against sophistic rhetoric work equally well against all forms of rhetoric? Explain your answer.
- In Phaedrus Plato suggests there might be a true art of rhetoric. If so, what goal would that art seek, and how would it pursue that goal? What sorts of knowledge would the practitioner of the true art of rhetoric have to master? Finally, in what way could Plato’s myth of the charioteer be understood as a metaphor for his theory of a true art of rhetoric?
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Recommended Readings
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On Plato
I. M. Crombie. An Examination of Plato’s Doctrines. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961.
Jon Moline. Plato’s Theory of Understanding. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1981.
On Plato’s View of Rhetoric
Seth Benardete. The Rhetoric of Morality and Philosophy: Plato’s Gorgias and Phaedrus. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1991.
Edwin Black. “Plato’s View of Rhetoric.” Quarterly Journal of Speech 44 (December 1958): 361–374.
George Kennedy, Classical Rhetoric and Its Christian and Secular Tradition, 2nd ed. (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1999), 54
Brian Vickers, In Defense of Rhetoric (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 148.
On Plato’s Gorgias
George Kimball Plochmann and Franklin E. Robinson. A Friendly Companion to Plato’s Gorgias. Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1988.
Plato. Gorgias. Trans. W. C. Helmbold. Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1952; Gorgias. Trans. T. Irwin. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979.
Robin Reames, The Ancient Art of Thinking For Yourself: The Power of Rhetoric in Polarized Times (New York: Basic, 2024), 157; Smith, Rhetoric and Human Consciousness, 47.
Adele Spitzer. “The Self-Reference of the Gorgias.” Philosophy and Rhetoric 8 (1975):1–22.
On Plato’s Phaedrus
Jane V. Curran. “The Rhetorical Technique of Plato’s Phaedrus.” Philosophy and Rhetoric. 19 (1986), 66–72.
Plato. Phaedrus. Trans. W. C. Helmbold and W. G. Rabinowitz. Indianapolis, IN: Liberal Arts Press, 1956.
Plato. Phaedrus. Trans. Alexander Nehamas and Paul Woodruff. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1995.